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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
These considerations make the first ground of the decision-that the
enforcement suit is exclusive and that therefore the court lacks juris-
diction to entertain a suit for declaratory relief-somewhat problematic.
Yet the factors relied upon by the court seem to be a proper basis for
denying declaratory judgment in the discretion reserved to the courts by
the Declaratory Judgment Act, which represents the second ground of the
present decision.
P. B. R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGET OF COUNSEL-RIGHT TO EFFEcTmVE CouN-
su,-[United States].-The petitioner, an assistant United States Attorney,
was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to defraud the government. At the
beginning of the trial, the court suggested that the petitioner's attorney
represent a co-defendant, Kretske, whose attorney had withdrawn from
the case. When petitioner objected, the court withdrew its suggestion. How-
ever, petitioner's attorney, after consulting with Kretske, suggested that
he be appointed to represent the latter. The trial court thereupon appointed
him attorney for Kretske. Petitioner did not object during the trial which
lasted a month. Fifteen weeks after the trial had ended, he appealed on
the ground that the court's action without his approval had denied him
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The appeal was
denied and the petitioner brought writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Held: sharing of counsel without express consent violated the Sixth Amend-
ment. Gl sser v. United States.,
The importance of the right to counsel as shown by the historical devel-
opment in the English common law and in American colonial history2 in-
sured its inclusion as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.8
1. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 405. (Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
Chief Justice Stone dissenting.)
2. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, 61, the majority opinion
contains an interesting discussion of the development of the right to counsel
in the American colonies, and cites the following authorities: Zephaniah
Swift, A System of the Law of Connecticut, (1795-1796) Vol. II, Bk. 5, "Of
Grimes and Punishments," c. XXIV, "Of Trials," 398-399; Del. Const.
(1776) Art 16, Ga. Const. (1798) Art. 3, §8, Md. Const. (1776) Art. 19,
Mass. Const. (1780) Part I, Art. 12, N. H. Const. (1784) Part I, Art. 15,
N. Y. Const. (1777) Art. 34, Pa. Const. (1776) Art. 9; North Carolina,
Session Laws 1777, c. 115, §85 (North Carolina Rev. Laws, 1715-1796, Vol.
1, 316), South Carolina, Act of August 20, 1731, §XLIII Grinike, South
Carolina Public Laws, (1682-1790), 130 (right to counsel assured in capital
offenses), Va., Chap. VII §III, Laws Of Va., 8th Geo. II, 4 Hening, Stat.
at L., 404 (petitioner in capital offenses allowed counsel on his petition to
court), "An Act Declaratory of Certain Rights of the People of the State" s.
6 Rev. Pub. Laws, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, (1798).
3. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, the Supreme Court seem-
ingly placed the right to counsel, as it might arise in state cases, within
the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
action was in accord with the practice of placing the "fundamental" rights
contained in the first eight Amendments to the Constitution within the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Betts v. Brady (June 1, 1942)
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However, the accused may waive the right to counsel. But in protecting
such a fundamental right the Supreme Court has been extremely cautious
in permitting its waiver. In Johnson -v. Zerbst' the Supreme Court stated
that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of
the right must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Under this doctrine of examining every case upon its merits, the Court
has determined that the right cannot be waived unless the accused knows
that he possesses the right irrespective of external circumstances such as
his ability to pay counsel's fees.5 Consequently, the trial court must inform
the accused of his right and appoint counsel unless the accused expressly
waives his right,6 which waiver must be noted on the record of the trial
court.7 However, if, after being informed of his right, the accused freely
and voluntarily pleads guilty without asking for or receiving the assistance
of counsel, his conduct is an intelligent waiver of his constitutional right.8
From these decisions it is apparent that the petitioner in the instant
case did not waive his right to counsel. There was no express waiver noted
in the trial court record. While an implied waiver might possibly be read
from his failure to object to sharing his counsel with Kretske, the Supreme
Court is undoubtedly sound in its stand that it must indulge every possible
presumption against the waiver of a fundamental right o
Since the petitioner had not waived the right to counsel, the Court had
to decide next if he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel
which is an implicit element of the right.10 It is rather apparent that
in the instant case the Supreme Court overlooked the realities of the
situation in its desire to safeguard fundamental rights. The accused
was an experienced attorney particularly skilled in criminal law. By
virtue of such experience, he knew or should have known that, while
there are certain disadvantages in the sharing of counsel between de-
fendants in a conspiracy trial, there are certain advantages to be gained
as well.11 The accused raised no objection at the trial to any of his at-
torney's actions in the conduct of the trial.'2 In view of these circum-
62 S. Ct. 1252 the Court placed the right to counsel outside the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision in Betts v. Brady can be ques-
tioned severely in view of the Court's past characterization of the right to
counsel as "fundamental," in Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 70, and Grosjean
v. American Press Co. (1936) 297 U. S. 233, 243-244.
4. (1938) 304 U. S. 458.
5. Walker v. Johnston (1941) 312 U. S. 275.
6. Holiday v. Johnston (1941) 313 U. S. 550.
7. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U. S. 458.
8. Erwin v. Sanford (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1939) 27 F. Supp. 892; Harpin v.
Johnston (1940) 109 F. (2d) 434, cert. den. (1940) 310 U. S. 624.
9. Glasser v. U. S. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 457, 465, 86 L. Ed. 405.
10. Louie Yung v. Coleman (D. C. S. D. Idaho, 1934) 5 F. Supp. 702;
Thomas v. District of Columbia (App. D. C. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 424; Neufield
v. U. S. (App. D. C. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 375.
11. That is, planning a joint defense and insuring against reciprocal
recrimination.
12. Besides William Stewart, the attorney in question, the accused was
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stances there is some question as to the soundness of the reasoning of the
majority opinion in determining that the sharing of counsel in the instant
case means that the accused was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The petitioner's appeal on the ground of denial of his rights under the Sixth
Amendment was obviously a lawyer's afterthought.
Further, the decision is regrettable in the sense that it comes on the heels
of a recent line of cases in which the Supreme Court looked very much to
the realities in order to determine if the right to counsel had been denied.
In Poull v. Alabama's the Supreme Court went behind the record to
examine the background of the defendants before determining that they
had been denied the right to counsel since counsel had been appointed in
too haphazard a fashion and at too late a date to provide for adequate pre-
trial preparation, which is a fundamental part of the right. In a later
ease the Supreme Court held that a denial by the trial court of a continu-
ance requested by the defendant did not deprive the defendant of his con-
stitutional rights if it did not appear that such continuance would lead to
a stronger defense or lead the defense to obtain more witnesses.1" In a
matter involving the competency of attorneys assigned to represent the
accused the Supreme Court held that the failure of counsel to reserve cer-
tain exceptions was, at worst, according to the facts, mere negligence or
error of judgment and not a denial of the effective assistance to counsel. 15
This line of cases involved primarily the right to counsel as contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment. It may well be that the Supreme Court in
the instant ease arising under the Sixth Amendment is proceeding upon the
theory that "* * * constitutional privileges or immunities may be conferred
so explicitly as to leave no room for an inquiry* * *,,16 The dissenting
opinion in the instant case offers the better view, however, when it states
that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are not mere abstractions but
must be viewed objectively. Only by such treatment can their importance
be preserved and the guarantees be prevented from becoming hollow refuges
f1rom the law.
E. P.
CONTRACTS-CONTINGENT FEE Fop EXPERT WITNEss-[Missouri].-Plain-
tiff, a psychiatrist, brought suit on a contract providing compensation of
$26,000 for his services as an expert witness in a will-contest, payment of
the fee being contingent upon the success of that litigation. His services
consisted of reading depositions, hearing the testimony of witnesses, and
holding conferences with witnesses and counsel, upon which his opinion
also represented by one George Callaghan and himself. However, Stewart
was the most active defense attorney during the trial.
13. (1982) 287 U. S. 45.
14. Avery v. State of Alabama (1940) 308 U. S. 444.
15. Peterson v. State (1933) 227 Ala. 361, 150 So. 156, cert. den. (1934)
291 U. S. 661.
16. Snyder v. Mass. (1934) 291 U. S. 97, 116.
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